Nathan Seamons v. Larry D. Anderson et al : Defendants and Cross-Appellants Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Nathan Seamons v. Larry D. Anderson et al :
Defendants and Cross-Appellants Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinne
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Seamons v. Andersen, No. 7691 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1514
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving 
partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND, 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ANDERSON and 
HANS P. ANDERSON, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and RICHARD PETERSON, . 
Defendant, Counter-Claimant, 
Cross-Claimant, Respondent 
and Cross-Appelllant, 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and 
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners, 
doing business in the firm name and 
style of VALLEY CAR MARKET, 
· Defendants and 
Cross-Appellants. 
' II-~ E:D 
~ ~~ p 1 ,) 1 J s: j 
Defendants and Cross-Appellants Brief 
CLAYTON E. NIELSEN AND RAY BITTERS 
Case No. 7691 
BULLEN & OLSON, 
Thatcher Building 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for Cross-
Appellants, Nielsen 
·and Bitters. 
Hon . . Lewis Jones, Judge 
I Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for the County of 
Cache. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Statement of Facts ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
Statement of Points 
Point I --------------------------. ___ -.--. ------------------------------------- 6 
Point II ___________________________________ . _____ ----------------------------- 6 
Argument 
Point I. That the trial court errored in making 
and entering its decree dated April 9, 1951, in award-
ing the defendant, counter-claimant and cross-claim-
ant, Richard Peterson, judgment against the defend-
ants, Clayton E. Nielsen and Ray Bitters, jointly and 
severally, for the-sum of $300.00, and in making and 
entering any of its findings of fact or conclusions of 
law which are in support qf said judgment. ---------------- 7 
Point II. That the court errored in making and 
entering its finding that Nielsen and Bitters were 
partners in Valley Car Market and in making its find-
ing No. 16 that at the time of the original transaction 
the Andersons paid the sum of $100.18 to the other 
parties. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ________ _ _ __ ____ _ _____ _ _ _ _______ _______ _ __ _____ _______ ____ __ _ _ ___ _ 16 
INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving· 
partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND, 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ANDERSON and 
HANS .P. ANDERSON, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and RICHARD PETERSON, 
Defendant, Counter-Claimant, 
Cross.-Claimant, Respondent 
and Cross-Appelllant, 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and 
RAY BITTERS, Co-Partners, 
doing business in the firm name and 
style of VALLEY CAR MARKET, 
Defendants and 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS 
CLAYTON E. NIELSEN AND RAY BITTERS 
Case No. 7691 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by Nathan Seamons for 
a money judgment against the defendants, Andersons, 
upon a conditional sales contract covering a 1948 
Mercury and for the foreclosure of said contract. Richard 
Peterson was joined as a party defendant. He had been 
the prior owner of said .autol!lobile and wrongfully held 
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the certificate of title to it. Ray Bitters; doing business 
as Valley Car Market, and his employee, Clayton E. 
Nielsen, were also joined as defendants. They had aqted. 
as the middlemen in the sale of the automobile from the 
defendant, Peterson, to the defendant, Larry D. Anderson. 
The defendant, Richard Peterson, in his pleadings, 
answered the plaintiff's complaint and also filed a counter-
claim against the plaintiff and a cross-complaint against 
the defendants, Nielsen and Bitters, asking that the 
~fercury be delivered up to him or that he have a money 
judgment in the sum of $550.00, which he claimed was 
due him by the plaintiff, Seamons, and the defendants, 
Nielsen and Bitters. He asked for no relief against the 
Andersons at the outset, but later made a claim against 
them. The defendants, Andersons, filed an answer to 
the plaintiff's complaint and a cross-complaint against 
Nielsen and Bitters asking for a money judgment against 
them. No relief was granted the Andersons on this prayer 
against Nielsen and Bitters, and although the defendants, 
Andersons, assigned this an error (Point No.7, Page 121) 
in their Statement of Points relied upon by the appellants 
on appeal, this assignment of error and portion of the 
appeal was later waived by the Andersons (Tr. 349), and 
is not now before this Court. 
The facts of this case began in April, 1949, when the 
defendant, Peterson, first approached- the defendant, 
Nielsen, at the Valley Car Market, and requested them 
to sell his 1948 Mercury (Tr. 8, 9, 247). Nielsen was an 
employee of Valley Car Market, owned and operated by 
Bitters ( Tr. 300, 301, Exhibit B1). Peterson expressed a 
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desire to receive $1950.00 for the car, and Valley was to 
receive a commission over and above said sum (Tr. 42, 
248, 266). The Mercury was delivered to the Valley Car 
Market for Valley to sell for Peterson, and later on the 
defendant, Larry Anderson, turned up as a prospective 
purchaser ( Tr. 9, 188). Nielsen informed Anderson that 
the price of the Mercury was $2095.00 (Tr. 189), and 
Larry Anderson asked Nielsen about trading in a 1938 
Packard. Nielsen told Anderson that he would .have to 
clear this with Peterson, which he did (Tr. 9, 27, 189, 
259). The agreement arrived at between Anderson and 
Peterson, through the Valley Car Market, was that the 
purchase price for the Mercury was to be $2095.00, pay-
able by the Andersons by a trade-in allowance on the 1938 
Packard of $425.00, $1400.00 to be secured through fin-
ance and a balance of $270.00 in cash by June 1st. 
( $425.00 plus $1400.00 plus $270.00 equals $2095.00 ). 
Of this, Peterson was to receive $1950.00 _and Valley Car 
$145.00. This agreement was entered into on April 25, 
1949. (Defendant Peterson's Exhibit No. 1, Tr. 10, 211). 
The $270.00 was represented by a post-dated check (for 
some reason made out in the sum of $267.00). In brief, 
the total consideration passing was $2095.00, broken down 
as follows: $1400.00 from finance, $425.00 on the Packard 
and $270.00 by a post-dated check ( Tr. 211), Peterson to 
get $1950.00 and Valley Car $145.00. 
The Packard automobile, valued at $425.00, was de-
livered by And~rson as part of the purchase price and left 
with Valley Car Market by Peterson to be sold for him 
( Tr.· 286, 46, 47, 49). 
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The $1400.00 was secured from the Commercial 
Credit Corporation, through the plaintiff, and it was in 
connection with this financing transaction that the de-
fendants, Andersons, executed the conditional sales con-
tract upon which the plaintiff commenced this action. Of 
the said $1400.00, the sum of $1300.00 was paid to Richard 
Petersoit, and $100.00 was retained by Valley Car Market 
as part of its commission ( Tr. 249, 288). 
As to the $267.00 check, $150.00 was paid on this 
check by Larry Anderson on May 6, 1949, of which sum 
$100.00 was paid to Peterson sometime later in May and 
$50.00 retained by Valley Car Market upon their com-
mission (Tr. 289, 262). Later on, this $267.00 check was 
turned over to Peterson with the sum of $117.00 remaining 
unpaid on it by the Andersons ( Tr. 212, 249, 72). The 
reason the check was kept by Nielsen and not delivered 
to Peterson sooner was that Peterson was out of the area 
so much that it was more convenient to have Anderson 
make the payments, such as the $150.00 payment on it, 
to Nielsen (Tr. 77.) 
Therefore, on this original transaction, Peterson re-
ceived $1300.00 of the finance money, $425.00 by the 
trade-in of the Packard, and $100.00 on the post-dated 
check, and has coming the sum of $117.00 from Anderson 
on the post-dated check. The Valley Car Market received 
$100.00 of the finance money and $50.00 of the payment 
made on the post-dated check. The total of this consider-
ation equals $2095.00, (less $3.00 to be accounted for 
because the post-dated check was made for $267.00 in-
stead of $270.00) of which $1945.00 went to Peterson's 
and $150.00 to Valley Car Market's. 
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;pursuant ·to a subsequent agreement. wi~h Peterson, 
Valley Car Market attempted to sell the 1938 Packard 
taken in by Peterson, and finally did sell it to one Darley 
for a Chrysler trade-in and $225.00 in cash. Of this 
$225.00 in cash Valley paid $108.00 t.o the finance comp-
any in an effort to save the Mercury from repossession, 
with Peterson's approval ( Tr. 20, 21, 299); the sum of 
approximately $65.00 or $75.00 was paid to various con-
cerns in order to put the Packard into a condition to meet 
inspection requirements at the time of sale, (Tr. 45, 46, 
4 7, 299 and defendants, Nielsen's and Bitters' Exhibits 
B3, B4, B5, Findings of Fact No. 8 ), and the balance of 
said $225.00, together with the Chrysler, were tendered 
to Peterson, who refused them for the reason that he 
wanted to wait to see what was going to come of the deal 
( Tr. 40, 48, 299). The Trial Court made a finding in his 
oral decision (Tr. 344) that the Chrysler automobile be-
longed to defendant Peterson. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. That the trial court errored in making and 
entering its decree dated April 9, 1951, in awarding the 
defendant, counter-claimant and cross-claimant, Richard 
Petersonn, judgment against the defendants, Clayton E. 
Nielsen and Ray Bitters, jointly and severally, for the 
sum of $300.00, and in making and entering any of its 
findings of fact or conclusions of law which are in support 
of said judgment. 
P'oint 2. That the court errored in making and enter-
ing its findings that Nielsen and Bitters were partners in 
Valley Car Market and in making its finding No. 16 that 
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at the -time of the original transaction the Andersons paid 
the sum of $100.18 to the other parties. 
The Statement of Points relied upon by the defend-
ants, Clayton E. Nielsen and Ray Bitters, as cross-appell-
ants, on file herein (Vol. 1, Tr. on Appeal, Page 132 ), 
contains fourteen points most of which said points allege 
that the court committed error in making certain findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, resulting in an erroneous 
judgment against the cross-appellants, Nielsen and Bitters, 
as stated in Point No. 1 above. In order to prevent re-
dundency or duplicity in accordance with Rule 75 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, said points are not re-
peated here, but will be argued under the broad Point 
No. 1 hereinabove set forth. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
The cross-appeal of the defendants, Clayton E. Niel-
sen and Ray Bitters, who are sometimes referred to herein 
as Valley Car Market or just Valley, goes only to that 
portion of the court's decree wherein the court awarded 
the defendant and cross-claimant, Richard Peterson, judg-
ment against Nielsen and Bitters jointly and severally. 
We strongly feel that the court's judgment in this respect 
is not supported by any evide:r:tce, and that it is in direct 
conflic~ with the jury's findings in its advisory verdict, 
questions and answers No. 1 and 2, which findings the 
court adopted. 
The jury's advisory verdict (Vol. 1, Tr. of Record, 
Page 76) insofar as the cross-appellants, Nielsen and Bit-
ters, are concerned on appeal, provides as follows: 
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"1. Did Richard Peterson ev~r authorize the Valley 
Market or Clayton Nielsento sell and deliver the Mercury 
car in question to Larry D. and H. P. Anderson? (Answer 
"yes" or "no.") 
ANSvVER: Yes. 
2. Was Richard Petersen, by agreement with the 
Valley Car Market, to receive $1950 for his ~1ercury re-
gardless of what the . Packard sold for from said Valley 
Car Market? (Answer "yes" or "no.") 
ANSWER: No. 
The defendant, Peterson, in all of his pleadings con-
cerning and directed toward the defendants, Nielsen and 
Bitters, and in his testimony throughout the trial, at-
tempted to establish the theory that Nielsen and Bitters 
were in effect insurers insofar as his $1950.00 was con-
cerned. 
He attempted to convince everyone that regardless 
of what happened, he was to receive $1950.00 in cash and 
that it was Nielsen and Bitters who owed it to him. A 
reference to the Transcript of Testimony (fr. 247, 264) 
will show that at the outset, Nielsen told Peterson that 
Valley· could not buy the Mercury, but that they would 
attempt to sell it for him. Later on, when the Packard had 
been turned in to Peterson as part of th~ consideration for 
the Mercury, N:ielsen again told Peterson that Valley could 
not~purchase the Packard, but that they would try to sell 
it for him (Tr. 286). Notwithstanding this early under-
standing, Peterson continued to maintain that it was 
Nielsen and Bitters who o\\red him the money for the 
Mercury (Tr. 263, 264, 265, 266). 
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A reference to the jury's advisory verdict, question 
and ansfer No 2, leaves little doubt in ones mind that the 
jury rejected this theory, for the jury specifically found 
that Peterson was not to receive $1950.00 in cash regard-
less of what the Packard sold for. 
There is only one logical interpretation to place on 
this jury finding: That the sale from Peterson to Anderson 
through Valley was not a cash transaction for $2095.00, 
but that Peterson agreed to take the Packard trade-in plus 
cash for his Mercury. In other words, the Packard was 
part of the consideration which Peterson agreed to take, 
and when Anderson delivered it, Peterson received the 
equivalent of $425.00 cash. 
Associating this with the jury's answer to question No. 
1, we must conclude that the jury found that Peterson 
was aware of the terms of the agreement between Valley 
and Anderson and that he acquiesced in the same. These 
terms were as stated in the written contract between 
Valley and Andersons, dated April 25, 1949, (Defendant 
Peterson's Exhibit No. 1 ) which it is important to note, 
Peterson had in his possession and introduced into evi-
dence at the trial, this contract provided that Anderson 
was to pay for the Mercury by trading in his 1938 Packard 
at a value of $425.00, by securing $1400 from the finance 
company and by making a deferred payment of $270.00, 
which is obviously represented by the $267.00 check 
signed by Larry Anderson, delivered to Valley and in tum 
delivered to Peterson, who had it in his possession and 
who introduced it into evidence as his Exhibit No. 4. 
The evidence clearly brings out that insofar as Peter-
son and Valley Car were concerned, there were two sep-
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arate arrangements. The first: The arrangeme~t whereby 
Peterson agreed with Valley to have Valley sell his 1948 
Mercury to Anderson. The second: The arrangement 
whereby Peterson agreed with Valley to have Valley sell 
Peterson's 1938 Packard, which he had taken in from 
Anderson on the Mercury. 
The evidence shows that the first transaction was 
complete with one exception to be mentioned when Larry 
Anderson produced $2095.00 worth of consideration by 
securing $~400.00 from finance, $425.00 on a trade-in of 
the Packard and $270.00 by a promise to pay in the future. 
The exception referred to is the fact that Anderson still 
_owes $117.00 on the last-named item, since he only paid 
$150.00 on the deferred payment represented by the 
$267.00 post-dated check. The jury agreed with this 
theory in answering question No. 2. 
Under no possible juggling of the facts can Peterson 
or the lower court make a valid finding supported by evi-
dence that on this first transaction there is anything due 
from Nielsen and Bitters or Valley to Peterson. The only 
sum remaining due is the sum of $117.00 on the post-
date~ check and there is no doubt in anyone's mind but 
that this is due from Anderson to Peterson and not from 
Nielsen, Bitters or Valley to Peterson. Peterson realized 
this during the trial, and made a belated effort to salvage 
something by amending his prayer to ask for a judgment 
against the Andersons: 
Thus, if there is any sum due from Nielsen, Bitters 
or Valley to Peterson, it must be by reason of the second 
arrangement, i.e., the sale of the 1938 Packard for Peter-
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son. Nielsen testified during his examination that there 
was approximately the sum of $52.00 due and owing to 
Peterson by Valley Car ~larket. Actually, when all of the 
figures were totaled, said sum was $41.49, as will be shown 
below. The Packard sold to one Darley for a Chrysler 
trade-in and $225.00 cash. There is no question as to the 
Chrysler since it still was available at the trial, and the 
Court, at the time it made its oral decision, made a finding 
that the Chrysler automobile did belong to Peterson 
( Tr. 344). Nielsen testified that this Chrysler was avail-
able to Peterson but that Peterson never bothered to do 
anything about it. Peterson never denied this. As to the 
$225.00 cash, $108.00 was paid to the Finance company, 
with Peterson's approval, to save the Mercury from re-
possession ( Tr. 20, 21, 299). Peterson never denied this. 
Further sums were expended by Valley to put the Packard 
in a condition to pass inspection so that it could be sold. 
These sums are evidenced by the defendants, Nielsen's 
and Bitters' Exhibit B3, B4 and B5, representing $13.56 
paid to Hopkins Auto Parts, $13.05 to Russells Incorpor-
ated, and $48.90 paid to Seamons and Loveland. These 
repair items total $75.51, and the Court, in its findings of 
fact No. 8, founa these expenditures to have been made. 
If we add the $108.00 paid to finance to the $75.51 paid 
for fixing the Packard, we have a total of $183.51. If we 
deduct this from the $225.00 cash received on the Packard, 
we have a balance of $41.49 which Valley Car Market 
owes to defendant, Peterson. This, of course, was tend-
ered to Peterson, who refused to accept it for the reason 
that he wanted to wait to see what was going to come of 
the deal ( Tr. 4~; 299 ) . 
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It therefore appears that Valley owes Peterson said 
sum of $41.49, which Valley has always been willing to 
pay. If Valley owes Peterson any more, it is the sum of 
$5.00, due to the fact that from the original consideration 
on the Mercury, Peterson received only $1945.00 instead 
of $1950.00, and Valley received $150.00 as commission 
instead of $145.00. This is brought out more fully in the 
recapitulation which is made a part of this brief and fol-
lows hereafter. 
The total of these two sums, $41.49, plus $5.00, falls 
far short of the $300.00 which the Court awarded Peterson 
in his judgment against Nielsen, Bitters and Valley. 
When the eviqence is read and analized, we strongly 
feel that it amply supports the theory of the case above 
presented and that the evidence in no way supports the 
Court's finding and conclusion that Nielsen and Bitters 
owe Peterson $300.00. 
If we accept the theory of the defendant, Peterson, 
as adopted by the Court, then we must completely igno~e 
the findings of the jury as represented by question and 
answer No. 2 of the advisory verdict. We must further 
adopt the theory that Nielsen, Bitters and Valley Car 
M;arket were not merely agents of Peterson in selling 
the various automobiles but that they were insurers, 
guaranteeing under any and all circumstances that the 
cars would sell for certain prices. We think that the 
evidence shows that Nielsen contacted Peterson througout 
the period of time of the various arrangements to secure 
his suggestions and authority before taking action. 
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On the other hand, we further feel that ~1r. Peterson's 
testimony indicates that he adopted a very careless man-
ner during all of said time, knowing full well what was 
going on, but failing to do anything to change it. Particu-
lar reference is made to the Transcript of Testimony, 
pages 263 through 266, which strongly indicates that 
Peterson was ·attempting to hold Nielsen for the purchase 
price of the car even though Peterson had previously 
testified that Nielsen had told him that Valley could not 
purchase the car but could merely act as a selling agency, 
and even though Pet~rson had approved the sale to Ander-
son. In other words, Peterson refused to accept any of 
his responsibilities, and then attempte<:l to circumvent his 
carelessness and negligence by putting all of the burden 
on someone else where it did not ·belong. 
It is further interesting to note, as the evidence un-
folds itself, that no where along the line did Peterson 
assert any authority or ownership of the Mercury, whether 
during his conversation with Anderson after Anderson 
had bought it, or in his later conversation with Nielsen or 
Seamons. He knew he had sold the car, and that Ander-
son had paid everything for it except the $117.00. It was 
not until long afterwards, when the controversy arose, 
that he commenced to claim, apparently as an after-
thought, that he was the owner of the Mercury. 
It is of furth€r importance to note that no where in 
Peterson's testimony does he assert that Nielsen acted 
beyond his authorization as Peterson's agent in any of 
the transactions. He does not deny that part of the Pack-
ard money was paid on the Mercury payments to save 
it from repossession with his authorization, nor did he 
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deny that sums were expended on the Packard in order to 
effect. a sale of it after he had told Nielsen to sell it for 
the best that he could. He never denied that he was 
offered the Chrysler and the net proceeds of the cash 
taken in on the sale of the Packard. 
In order to summarize the various transactions, there 
follows a Recapitulation which sets up the various ar-
rangements between the parties, the considerations in-
volved and their disposition: 
RECAPITULATION 
By agreement, entered into by Valley and Anderson, 
and approved by Peterson, Anderson was to pay $2095.00 
for Mercury as follows: 
Trade in (Packard) $ 425.00 
Finance (Seamons) 1400.00 
Deferred cash payment 270.00 (For some reason 
----- check was made 
$2095.00 out for $267.00) 
From the above consideration: 
1. Petersen received the Packard, and made an 
agreement with Valley to sell it, so he received from 
Anderson a consideration of ------------------------------------ $425.00 
2. Peterson received $1300.00 from the $1400.00 
secured by financing -------------------------------------------- $1300.00 
3. Peterson received $100.00 from Anderson as part 
payment on the post-dated check ------------------------ $100.00 
4. There still remains a balance to be collected on 
the check in the sum of $117.00, which is due from 
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Anderson to Peterson -------------------------------------------- $117.00 
This totals ------------------------------------------------ ____ ____ $1942.00 
which is $8.00 less than the $1950.00 agreed upon. 
From the above consideration: 
1. Valley received $100.00 from the $1400.00 
secured. from finance -------------------------------------------·- $100.00 
2. Valley received $50.00 from the $150.00 
paid in on the check ----------·------------------------------------ $50.00 
This totals _ _ _ _ ___ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ ______ __ _ _ __ __ _ ___ __ _______ _ _ _ $150.00 
or $5.00 more than the commission Valley was authorized 
to receive (all over 1950.00.) 
Thus, we see that Anderson owes Petersen $117.00 
on the check and $3.00 as the difference between $267.00 
and $270.00, and Valley owes Petersen $5.00. 
As to the Packard, which was a separate transaction: 
It sold for a Chrysler and $225.00~ 
1. The Chrysler was available for Petersen, but he 
never took it. He authorized its sale in court and it was 
sold for $25.00. 
2. The $225.00 cash was distributed as follows: 
$108.00 to Commercial Credit to protect the Mercury. 
(with Petersen;J s sanction. ) 
13.56 to Hopkins to prepare for inspection. 
13.05 to Russells' Inc. to prepare for inspection. 
48.90 to Seamons & Loyeland to prepare for in-' 
spection. (all with Petersen;J s sanction. ) 
$183.51 Total 
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Which leaves a balance of $41.49 of the $225.00, 
which sum Valley tendered to Petersen, who refused it. 
Thus, Valley owes Petersen $41.49, and in addition, 
the Chrysler automobile belong to Petersen, who author-
ized its sale in court. 
ARGUMENT 
Point II 
In making its oral decision, the trial Court specifi-
cally found that Nielsen and Bitters were operating Val-
ley Car Market as partners ( Tr. 345). In its findings the 
Court again found the parties to be partners and entered 
a judgment against them jointly and severally. 
It is our contention that the evidence conclusively 
shows that Bitters was the owner of the car lot and that 
Nielsen was his employee. The evidence shows that Bit-
ters started the car lot without Nielsen and that later 
Nielsen came to work for him. Later on, Nielsen left 
his employment and when Bitters disposed of the lot he 
did so as his own property and there never was any claim 
by Nielsen that he had any interest in it. There is no 
need to go into any lengths on this point since the Trans-
cript of Testimony, pages 300 and 301, together with 
Exhibit B1, sets up what the relationship was. 
As to the Courfs finding that the Andersons paid the 
sum of $100.18 to the other parties at the time of the 
original transaction, we are unable to find one bit of evi-
dence in the records substantiating this finding. The only 
cash passing at ·the time of the original transaction was 
the $1400.00 finance money. 
The $100.18 which the Court refers to, is _presumably 
the $108.00 which Valley Car paid to the finance company 
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on the Mercury payments out of the proceeds on the Pack-
ard in order to save the Mercury from repossession. 
While this finding is not important, we do raise it 
for the reason that we feel the Court's findings are unsub-
stantiated by the- evidence, and we point this out as one 
example among many. Of course, the bulk of the findings 
attacked by these cross-appellants go to the court's·finding 
that Nielsen and Bitters, as partners, owe Peterson $300.-
00, which we have argued more fully in Point I above. 
CONCLUSION 
The veidence does not support the Court's finding 
and conclusion that Nielsen and Bitters, jointly and sev-
erally, owe Peterson $300.00. On the other hand, the 
evidence strongly supports the fact that Nielsen and Bit-
ters owe less than $50.00 to Peterson and that they tend-
ered it to him but he refused to accept it. 
We stongly urge the proposition that the evidence 
does not support the Courf s findings, and that the judg-
ment against Nielsen and Bitters in the sum of $300 should 
be reversed, and that any judgment against Nielsen and 
Bitters be limited to the sum of $46.49, which sum Valley 
Car has always been willing to pay. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BULLEN & OLSON 
Thatcher Building 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for Cross-
Appellants, Nielsen 
and Bitters. 
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